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SOM-theme A     Primary processes within firms
Abstract
This paper deals with safety from an organizational perspective. Accidents are actually caused by
individual mistakes. However the underlying causes of accidents are often organizational. As a
link between these two levels - the organizational failures and mistakes - I suggest the concept of
role distance, which emphasizes the organizational characteristics. The general hypothesis is that
organizational goals are a main cause of role distance and accident-proneness within
organizations. Three different dimensions of ‘safety as a goal’ are distinguished: priority of safety,
and contradictory interests horizontally and vertically. The analysis at different levels does not
falsify our hypothesis, and these three dimensions seem to be of interest for the safety in chemical
industry.
21 Introduction: accident-proneness
Many industrial disasters in recent years show that organizations and their influence on
society have changed dramatically. Most literature dealing with occupational safety
emphasizes unsafe working conditions or individual characteristics. The research to be
presented below relates to organizational characteristics as a cause of accident-proneness
in different industrial organizations. Here the concept of organization relates to human
activities performed to produce goods. It implies both the functions and tasks within the
production, maintenance and shipping sequences of (chemical) industry. By organization
I understand a group of interrelated roles; it comprises formal organization as the product
of intended organization design (designed to set collective goals and make arrangements
to deploy available resources to attain those goals) and informal organization as a
coalition of multiple, possibly conflicting interests characterized by rules not laid down
in procedures.
In this paper I will first define the concept of accident-proneness, because “[b]efore
anything can be studied scientifically, it must be defined. This step, which sounds so easy,
has been a stumbling block for accident research ever since its early days” (Hale and Hale
1972:11, Osborn and Jackson 1988:925). Role distance is introduced as an intermediate
variable. I would like to study the influence of priorities and contradictory interests on
safety. These different dimensions of ‘safety as a goal’ are measured and analyzed.
From an organizational perspective risk is about problems of decision-making in
the face of uncertainty. Here probability cannot be calculated in a quantitative way but it
can only be described in relative terms like ‘more’ or ‘less’ (proneness). I adopt a broad
definition from everyday English and everyday life, and risk will be defined as: ‘human
activities that might cause an accident’. The words ‘human activities’ point to the role of
a voluntaristic actor (or: agent) and distinguishes the concept from danger1; human action
                                                
1In literature many different concepts are used, with a slightly different meaning. E.g. danger
seems to refer to the possibility that something unpleasant or undesirable might happen without
the intervention of an agent, e.g. getting struck by lightning while playing a game of football. The
3can reduce or increase the probability (and size) of the damage. This definition fits closely
the way in which the concept of risk is used within accident- or safety research. It only
involves ‘down-side risk’: problems or accidents, and not the opportunities. Here it equals
‘accident-proneness’ (or: operational risk); which is conceived as the opposite of safety
or reliability. This meaning of proneness is different from the one in the human error
literature. The human error approach focuses on proneness as differences in personal
attributes, e.g. clumsiness (e.g. Hale and Hale 1972:15, Dwyer 1991:56-57) (better:
‘error-proneness’). In this research accident-prone is considered to be an organizational
instead of an individual characteristic.
                                                                                                                               
related concept of hazard seems to refer to a kind of ‘worst case scenario’, or the potential
unpleasant results of technological characteristics (design, construction, material, etc.).
4Based on the observation that accidents are actually caused by mistakes (e.g.:
Heinrich 1959:13 Leplat 1987:133-, Reason 1990, Adams 1995:16), I will regard
mistakes (including dangerous behavior and attitudes2) as an aspect of accident-proneness.
Of course another aspect are (near-) accidents itself. A near-accident (or ‘near miss’) is
an incident that in other circumstances could have resulted in an accident. A
methodological problem is that information about mistakes and near-accidents is highly
dependent on beliefs and willingness to report. They are easy to hide, and people are
willing to hide because they feel ashamed or afraid to be punished3 and often they do not
consider near-accidents worth reporting. In terms of the famous iceberg metaphor the
mistakes are the part under water, the near-accidents are at the surface and the accidents
are the part above the water. Because the determinants of accidents and incidents are the
same, according to the iceberg-thesis, the consequences are less interesting and the
difference is only of academic interest.
The direct observation of the occurrence of accidents is practically impossible since
they tend to be rare and unpredictable (Hale and Hale 1972:12). To overcome the
reporting artefact somewhat I combined different aspects of accident-proneness and
measured them anonymously by a questionnaire instead of relying on the official statistics.
The main aspects of accident-proneness are (near-) accidents and mistakes.
2 Role theory
                                                
2For the use of mistakes, dangerous behaviour, and attitudes as ‘alternative criteria for study’ see:
Hale and Hale 1972:13-4
3
"For all non-fatal measures of risk there is a[n ..] intractable measurement problem, variously
labelled shame, guilt, responsibility, liability, stupidity, or the Hawthorne effect” (J. Adams
1995:90).
5As stated, mistakes are the proximate cause of accidents and will even be regarded as an
aspect of accident-proneness. However, as we will see, the underlying causes of accidents
are organizational. Still the link between individual- and organizational level demands a
theoretical description. For this description there are roughly two approaches: (1) the
‘Human error approach’ that looks at mistakes from out of an epistemological point of
view (different kinds of ‘irrationality’ as a cause of mistakes), and (2) role theory which
puts more emphasis on the organizational characteristics.
Because of the dominant role of mistakes in the accident-causation process it is a
common approach to study individual limitations (or irrationality) as a source of
accidents. Because of its focus at individual limitations this Human error approach is
sometimes popularly referred to as ‘train and blame ideas’. In a methodological sense
(ir)rationality is also a problematic concept to explain human errors. How can I observe
the phenomenon? An instrument to measure different kinds of rationality is unknown. In
a field study it is very difficult to observe mistakes, but it will be even more difficult to
observe different kinds of (ir)rationality. The main problem of an experimental situation
is its limited external validity, it is impossible to replicate precisely the conditions that
people face in the real world, their historical experience, and other contextual factors.
Role theory4 and especially the concept of role distance constitute an alternative
mediation between the large- and small-scale worlds. Roles serve as the boundary
between the organization and the individual, and represent the expectations of both. In the
                                                
4Role theory can be compared with the more narrow ‘adjustment/stress theory’ and
‘goals/freedom/alertness theory’. The first one postulates that people who are not adjusted to their
situation or integrated with it, will be liable to have more accidents. The goals/freedom/alertness
theory postulates that people have accidents because they were not alert to their true situation, and
that this lack of alertness was the result of a lack of involvement in their work, brought about by
being told exactly what to do and what not to do (Kerr in: Hale and Hale 1972:15-6)
6work of many authors (e.g. Goffman 1961, Merton and Nisbet 1966, Berger and
Luckmann 1966:96, Simon 1997:230) role reveals ‘the mediation between the
macroscopic universe of meaning objectivated in an organization and the ways in which
these universes are subjectively real to individual employees’. The main reason to suggest
role to link both levels is the (relatively to the human error approach) strong emphasis on
organizational characteristics instead of characteristics of the worker.
Learning one’s role in the organization and within the work group, and resolving
issues of role distance (role conflict and role ambiguity) has been found critical in
individuals’ success in organizations. Role conflict and ambiguity are associated with low
performance. Many dysfunctional consequences of role conflict and ambiguity in complex
organizations are reported: tension, turnover, dissatisfaction, anxiety, a greater concern
with own (vs. work group) performance, and lower performance (Gross et al. 1958, Kahn
et al. 1964, Rizzo et al. 1970, House et al. 1972, Beehr et al. 1976, Schuler et al. 1977,
Schuler 1979). The only dysfunctional consequence not studied yet seems accident-
proneness. With few exceptions, research on role distance has investigated or assumed
their dysfunctional effects on individual and organizational performance. However, about
the relation between role distance and accident-proneness two general hypotheses can be
formulated.
Little attention has focused on the possibility that ambiguous or conflicting roles
may contribute to organizational performance and may, in fact, be necessary if
organizations are to adapt to changes in their environments. This idea, as found in critical
and feminist theory (Ritzer 1992), is based on the view of organizations as “information-
processing systems which enact and respond to complex, dynamic, equivocal
environments in pursuit of multiple, conflicting, ambiguous goals” (Van Sell, Brief and
Schuler 1981:62). Role distance would sensitize occupants of boundary-spanning roles
to conflicting information and environmental uncertainty. According to this view role
conflict and ambiguity are the tools “by which organizations provide their members with
the discretion to respond to new information and to pursue sequentially a set of conflicting
out necessary organizational goals” (Weick 1979).
7Role distance describes the influence of organizational characteristics, like different
goals. I expect that less role distance will lead to fewer mistakes because of better
execution and integration of sub-tasks. Based on literature it is also possible to formulate
an alternative hypothesis about the flourishing influence of role distance on accident-
proneness. In a methodological sense role distance is a much less problematic concept
than ‘irrationality’; there are well-known and validated instruments to measure role
conflict and ambiguity (these will be discussed in paragraph five). However studies about
the multiple determinants of role distance are still very rare.
3 Safety as a goal
The concepts of risk and mistakes, introduced before, refer to an orientation towards
future events and to the problem of not being sure about the attainment of goals. Here
goals include both organizational goals and individual goals. Individuals do not just
‘copy’ the goals of the organization they work in. Individual employees tend to adopt
simplifying assumptions about organizational goals and the environment (Simon 1997:
bounded rationality). And many organizational goals (and individual tasks to reach these
goals) are loosely formulated, lacking unequivocal criteria. The goals can be very diverse
and even diametrically opposed, still I do not assume that the individual goals only reflect
personal interests. Organizational goals and other contingencies (the ‘frame of reference’)
provide the individual employees with some reference points of their goals.5 “The
individual is willing to make impersonal organizational decisions because a variety of
factors, or incentives, tie him to the organization–his salary, prestige, friendship, and
                                                
5Mascini (1999:41-58) distinguishes four different potential motives behind ‘safety as a goal’. His
research shows how the desire to stay healthy, or not to get an accident, is most important. This
is followed by the desire not to cause an accident that harms others. At the third placed is the
desire not to be hold responsible for accidents. And the least important motive is the lower
operating result because of accidents.
8many others” (Simon 1997:287). As a consequence these goals (priorities) can be changed
within the environment by manipulation of the reference points.
The reference points are related to “the subjective propensity to take risks”, an
element of the risk ‘thermostat’ described by Adams (1995). These points are highly
dependent on the reward system and the (subjectively perceived) risk. E.g. in many
organizations a common assumption is that working many hours would be in the interest
of both the organization and the individual employee. In 1918 Vernon published a
spectacular research: an increase in work time from 60 to 72 hours was associated with
two and a half times more accidents (Dwyer 1991:58). The central idea of this ‘fatigue
theory’ is that tired workers have accidents. From a broader perspective Simon (1997:
Ch.X) describes how priorities and contradictory interests (Simon: identification, loyalty),
can lead to role conflict. Here, the general hypothesis is that priorities and contradictory
interests produce reference points which stimulate role conflict and situations like time
pressure or overtime, and cause accident-proneness.
The anthropological concept of culture often involves values, beliefs, and roles.
However in safety literature the concept of ‘safety culture’ (Weick 1987 and HRT:
‘culture of reliability’) seems to be used in a very loose way, or to refer mainly to norms,
attitudes, and practices (e.g. Pidgeon 1991, 1997, Bax 1992, van Vuuren 1998, Meijer
1999). After measurement the narrow meaning almost equals ‘goal’, or at least goal is
considered to be a culture element by many. Safety as a goal involves norms that guide
practices at once, and the relative importance of safety compared to other goals (e.g.
whether to accept risks because of high time pressure). I prefer the concept of goal
because it does not suggest an insight in the profound values of people, it does not imply
that an undesirable situation cannot be changed in the short term (as culture does), and no
valid instrument to measure safety culture is known6.
                                                
6A petty exception is Koch (1993), who tries to ‘develop and validate an assessment device’ of
37 items. Especially four factors would be descriptive of a general safety culture:
accountability/responsibility, adaptiveness/responsiveness, hazard awareness and maturity.
93ULRULWLHV
Organizational effectiveness can be seen as a construct with a plethora of constituent
concepts. While all organizational research is aimed, ultimately, at identifying effective
performance and it is the fundamental dependent variable, “... no valid theories of
organizational effectiveness exist in organizational behavior, and no list of criteria has
ever been formulated that is either necessary or sufficient for evaluating the construct”
(Cameron in: Creed, Stout and Roberts 1993:57). The constituent concepts represent only
one aspect of the total construct space, one ‘dimension’, examples are economic
efficiency, cost leadership, differentiation, power, employee well-being, safety etc.7
                                                
7Cameron suggests that the greatest source of consensus on the performance criteria could come
from refocusing attention on the sources of ineffectiveness (here: an explicit focus on avoiding
mistakes). People who can agree on nothing else will recognize that they share their reluctance
against factors that inhibit successful organizational performance; so ineffectiveness is a non-goal.
According to Cameron (in: Creed et. al.) it would also enable analysis more responsive to the
practical concern for the elimination of ineffective or unreliable procedures and behaviors, and
for the continuation of effective ones. Here the non-goal is one aspect of reliability: safety, it
involves harmful deviations within reference points and practices.
Choosing only one dimension of organizational effectiveness to study, avoids the
problem of the dependent, or performance variable ‘effectiveness’, and formulation of a
list of criteria. Priority of safety simply refers to the way safety is defended against a
variety of other goals like time pressure and a limited budget (freely rendered from
Groeneweg 1994). But priority of safety still asks for the identification of constraints. The
contingency approach places the origins of norms (of ineffectiveness) with external
10
agents. Here political power, media coverage and public sentiments play an important role
in identification of the performance criteria.
The interpretation of cues about the environment, and the identification of
constraints, goals and referents provide an organization with priorities. In other words,
priorities find their origin in the (potential) result, e.g. economical or worst-case scenario,
in its interaction with the environment. The value based reference points within the
environment are, because of changing political and social forces, time and place specific.
In today’s Dutch society, for the organizations under study the antithesis of safety are
chemical dangers so consequential that the entire organization could through failure
impetuously lose the acceptance of the environment in which it operates. Because in this
research the focus is on the primary process (or: transformation process) departments like
marketing are part of the environment (and likely to be a main source of production
pressure).
Probably the main rival, that safety has to be defended against, is productivity. In
his 1996 article, Bill Richardson examines the development of modern management and
portrays it as a major problem-causer in modern society, rather than a problem-solver.
“Although scientific management is a vital underpinning to strategic development in a
highly competitive, productivity-conscious, organizational world, its intense, single-
minded and tunnel-visioned application raises the paradox of it being at one and the same
time, ‘saint and sinner’. Its ‘saint’ role is that of an economic productivity enhancing,
competitive capability bestower”. On the other side, Richardson focuses on the impact of
‘downsizing’ - an outcome of our presently extreme applications of scientific management
- as a creator of a number of “crisis/catastrophe trigger points”. The trigger points are born
from the impact of the delayering of organizational personnel and the reduction of people
employed and jobs available. Reorganization and increased work loads are factors which
have featured in a number of accidents of the past decade, such as those at Tenerife,
Zeebrugge, and many others.
So, safety can be described as the characteristic of an organization that performs
with little or no harmful deviations in its outcomes. Priority of safety can be considered
a non-goal, sought for whole organizations. The constraints and contingencies have to be
11
translated into organizational goals by organization participants and attention should be
paid to the relative importance of each objective. Safety cannot have the highest (or sole)
priority within any organization. In that case would, logically spoken, be the best solution
to stop the production to avoid any risk. However within any organization safety should
have a certain priority, and this has to be more or less consistent and sufficiently clear
among all employees. For example, the objective within organizations should not be ‘as
safe as possible’ but e.g. ‘no overtime after dark’. After this, an obvious hypothesis is that
a higher and more clear priority of safety will (because of decreased role conflict) lead to
less accident-proneness.
&RQWUDGLFWRU\LQWHUHVWV
Priority of safety is practically a functionalist concept, which assumes a unitary view of
organizations; organizations treated as cooperative systems in pursuit of (more or less)
common goals. Interests, on the other hand, follow from a more critical, neo-Marxian, or
pluralistic perspective on organizations; organizations as a collection of factionalised
groups with different goals and internal conflicts. Interests are about the (contradictory)
goals of groups and individuals within an organization and the covert resistance to goals.
Different employees within an organization will hold different goals (Cameron: ‘different
positions within the construct space’), they are often in conflict not because of confusion
about organizational priorities, or uncertainty about risks, but because they have different
interests.
Contradictory interests is about the different goals within an organization. Different
(groups of) employees have different goals, or ‘hidden agendas’. Simon (1997:214)
describes this as the extent to which someone’s attitudes and actions are conditioned by
personal interests rather than organizational priorities, as described by the reaction: “You
run your department, and I will run mine.” The personal interests can be derived from
identification with team, shift or department, or from private goals. Each agent within the
organization is concerned with a particular problem involving risks, and has its own view
of how risky activities are likely to be. One may view a longer shut-down period as an
12
economic loss, while for others a shorter period is seen as a threat to their safety. Interests
are based on different values. “Risk and its management should be viewed as a game in
which the rules must be socially negotiated within the context of a specific problem”
(Kunreuther and Slovic 1996:11). This game is a process in which people advance their
individual or shared interests by amassing power and using it. Political processes may
either reinforce or overturn existing power structures to deal better with changing
environmental conditions (Pfeffer 1981, Meyer and Starbuck 1993, Creed, Stout and
Roberts 1993).
Studies identifying and evaluating conflicts showed, if more severe conflicts are
taken into consideration, a correlation between the number of conflicts and the number
of accidents (Leplat 1987:187). Nevertheless within (safety) literature no clear distinction
is made between the influence of contradictory interests horizontally (e.g. between
different departments or coworkers) and contradictory interests vertically (e.g. between
employees and supervisor, or between shop floor and staff). Here the hypothesis is that
in a situation with (harsh) conflicts there will be more accident-proneness. More precise:
I expect contradictory interests, both horizontally and vertically, will (because of more
role conflict) lead to accident-proneness.
4 Field study
The empirical part of my research is carried out within eight different organizations (A
- H). These are organizations within the Dutch exploration and chemical industry and they
operate around different processes related to the exploration of gas, and the production
of base - and functional chemicals. They are, as a joint venture or as a full daughter, part
of multinational companies. The organizations under study can be described as complex
and tightly coupled8, and know about the same degree of technology. The main chemical
                                                
8Because of chemical characteristics of the (raw) materials, it is not realistic to decouple different
activities much further to reduce their ‘detailed interdependence’.
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risks within these eight organizations are: high energy concentrations, high pressure,
intoxication, poisoning, fire, and explosion. They have a comparable structure of
positions, and similar departments can be distinguished: production, maintenance, and
staff/technology.
A field study during a shut-down, within one of the eight organizations, consisted
out of participating research and interviews. The main goal was to do observations to
obtain an inward view of the production process, the course of a shut-down, the main
tasks of the different functions and departments, the coordination process during toolbox
and other meetings, etc. Beside this, within six of the eight organizations, more than
twenty interviews were conducted with plant managers, safety officers and other key-
persons. These lasted in between 90 and 120 minutes each.
Because of statistical reliability finally a questionnaire approach was chosen. Based
on the analysis of accident reports, interviews, and scales derived from literature (e.g.
Miller 1991) survey items were applied to the situation within the chemical industry. The
measurement scales of these items were mostly five-point Likert scales. In May 1999 this
survey was sent to all employees within the production, maintenance and shipping
sequences within organizations A - H, and their staff. The respondents were operators,
(different kind of) engineers, shippers, support staff, supervisors, etc. 436 employees
cooperated within the research (equals 56% response). The response can be qualified as
a relatively high one (at least for Dutch standards). And, for the chemical industry in the
Netherlands, it is probably a representative cross selection of the population.
Table 1: &KDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHVXUYH\UHVSRQGHQWV
Organization A B C D E F G H Total
Response % 56 60 72 39 65 52 65 76 56
Response # 44 36 29 81 52 83 36 75 436
Production* 21 26 21 45 41 55 29 54 292
Maintenance 20 8 5 30 6 23 5 15 112
Other** 3 2 3 6 5 5 2 6 32
Executive and supervisory staff 15 13 12 41 15 30 13 27 166
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Organization A B C D E F G H Total
Non-supervisory staff 29 23 17 40 37 53 23 48 270
*: includes shipping department. **: includes technology department and staff
(In case of some scale-analysis N > 436 because of inclusion of organization I).
The eight organizations can be described by some simple indicators (table 1). At first sight
the most startling numbers are the ratio between executive and non-supervisory staff
within organization D, and the one between production and maintenance within
organization A. The last ratio can be explained by the fact that the maintenance
department of organization A is actually working within three different organizations (A,
C and G). To preserve confidentiality, these organizations will not be described in more
detail.
5 Measurement
To measure the different aspects of accident-proneness, I combined two ‘subscales’: (1)
items about the frequency and severity of (near-) accidents within the last three years, and
about the ‘general’ safety within an organization and (2) items about the frequency and
kind of mistakes made by colleagues. (For development and validation of the
measurement device see Van As 2000).
To  measure role conflict and ambiguity items are used based on the conflict and
ambiguity scales developed by Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1970, also: McLaughlin
1986:494) and the identification and commitment scales developed by Van Veldhoven
and Meijman (1994). In case of role conflict, 9 questions are asked about conflicts at the
level of individual tasks (Likert scales, Alpha = .7949; N 450, total score: 0 - 40). E.g.
‘Do you have to do your work in another way than you would like to?’ and ‘Often I have
to do unnecessary work’. To measure role ambiguity, 12 items were included about
ambiguities at the level of individual tasks (Likert point scales, Alpha = .8253; N 420,
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total score: 0 - 48). E.g. ‘I know exactly what my duties are’ and ‘I know how I’ll be
evaluated’.
Goal is a construct that exists out of two concepts: priorities and interests, both
describing goal consensus and clarity. Priority of safety involves the relative priority of
safety as an organizational goal towards other goals like production/time pressure, or a
limited budget. Interests include the different goals (or: the covert resistance to goals) of
individuals and groups within an organization; conflicts, or commitment and cooperation,
between departments and individuals. I suggested a distinction between contradictory
interests: horizontally and vertically.
To measure priority of safety, items are used partly based on the ‘incompatible
goals scale’ developed by Wagenaar, Souverijn and Hudson (1993). For measurement,
six questions are asked about the relative priority of safety (Likert scales, Alpha = .7388;
N 414, total score: 0 - 24). E.g. ‘In our organization money is much more important than
safety’ and ‘The budget for safety is much too limited’. To measure contradictory interests
vertically, items are used that are partly based on a scale developed by Trommelen and
Zeelenberg (1993). For measurement, only four questions are asked about the relation
between employees and supervisor and between shop floor and staff (five point Likert
scales, Alpha = .6988; N 426, total score: 0 - 16). E.g. ‘In general supervisors and
employees get along together pretty well’ and ‘Do you have conflicts with your supervisor
about the contents of your tasks?’.
To measure contradictory interests horizontally, items are used based on the
‘working with each other scale’ developed by Georgopoulos and Mann (1962). For
measurement seven questions are asked about the relation between different departments
and between coworkers (Likert scales, Alpha = .7196; N 382, total score: 0 - 28). E.g.
‘When there are problems, my department/team/shift (the smallest one) receives a lot of
support from other departments/teams/shifts’, ‘Do the people from different departments
who have to work together do their full share, so that each contributes to making the other
person’s work a little easier?’ and ‘All employees are pulling in the same direction; they
pursue the same goals’.
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6 Analysis
The data can be analyzed at two different levels: (1) A quantitative analysis at individual
level, and (2) an analysis at organizational level based on the quantitative data combined
with more qualitative data. For the analysis at individual level the environment of each
respondent is treated as a discrete organization. The advantage is that the organizational
influences can be detected on a more detailed level. For example the influences of
different departments, and factories within the same organization could be discerned at
this level. The disadvantage is that this analysis does not make a clear distinction between
organizational characteristics and characteristics of the respondent (e.g. a critical or even
plaintive attitude towards the organization). For this reason we have to complement the
analysis at individual level with a more conservative analysis at organizational level. Here
we can assume the characteristics of the respondents to be the same for the eight
organizations under study.
At individual level the data will be analyzed by path analysis. Path analysis is an
extension of multiple regression. Its aim is to provide estimates of the magnitude and
significance of hypothesized causal connections between variables. The standardized
coefficient ßeta makes it possible to compare different regression coefficients. These
represent the relative importance of different variables. Because there are only eight
organizations under study, a reliable statistical analysis is impossible at organizational
level. If possible I will try to interpret these data in a more qualitative way. First role
conflict and ambiguity scores are compared to the accident-proneness score. Subsequently
scores on priority of safety, contradictory interests vertically, and contradictory interests
horizontally are compared to the accident-proneness and role distance scores (figure 1).
